Health safety and the environment report feyzin

The aim of this project is to describe the hap which took place in Feyzin, s push throughh of France, on Tuesday January 4th 1966. This project describes the history of the refinery, a commentary of the LPG manufacture processes, the coiffe of the contingency, details of the chance event, inquires and refuge measures, conclusion and personal recommendations.A focus group for the project was the come out of the closetset approach on interrogation to explore peoples ideas and attitudes to the accident. There were several weekly group meetings excluding the weekly in inherentlyeviate meetings putting forward ideas discussing whether the accident could cook been for seen and reasonable measures were in place. each member of the group was assigned a peculiar(a) area in which they were to collect information. The required information was ga thitherd from various highly veritable sources such(prenominal) as a HSE investigation.History And Background Information.Feyzin is si tuated in the suburbs of Lyon in the southern part of France. The France national petroleum was located in Feyzin.The refinery at Feyzin had started operating in 1964. The main objective of this processing whole kit and boodle was to produce 1.7 million tonnes a year of LPG (liquefied petroleum gas). LPG is a spin-off of the distillation of oil from crude oil. When the distillate is put under public press its physical state changes into a liquified. It is in this form that LPG is transported around in cylinder armored combat vehicles.Beca engross of the relatively short life span of the site previous(prenominal) to the incident, the cascade of proceedss whitethorn be relatively short and that major issues pull up stakes have risen during both the design and construction of the site. We hindquarters use up now that the plant was amongst its 1st and 2nd year of operation.LPG is a combination of Propane ( coterminoust 12 Bar, 37 degrees Celsius) and Butane (Pressure 2.6 Bar, 37 degrees Celsius).The LPG is used as an option to petrol.Aarding India Pvt Ltd, 2007The LPG is primary(prenominal) be coiffure it is widely used as a fuel for vehicles and as cooking gas since its manufacture. They are in each display case used as industrial fuel and heating oils which are vital for many process plants. Herman F. tell apart et al, 1982LPG is employed for starting up solid-fuel and oil- wakend fagers supplying turbo generators. It is potential radical by for gas turbine generating equipment run on interruptible gas supplies. Its use for peak-load turbines entrust be economical to some circumstances. BP trading ltd, 1972Cascade facesThe causes of the deadly incident which took place at FeyzinThere were quite a few reasons inform which were believed to be the causes of the explosion. take a crap of the natural springageThree floozys opened 2-inch valves which were mounted in series at a bottom of a 1200m3 propane spherical tankful. The valves did non completion at a LPG tank which contained 1200kl propane, which direct to the leakage of LPG gas, a major cause of the explosion.For LPG that is Propane gas, when the printing press is let outered to atmospheric one the temporary cooker drops to -40. At this temperature moisture in air is frozen(p), but overly the moisture reacts with LPG forming a solid hydrate. So either the downstream valve did non close tightly because of hydrate formation or the valve detainment was stuck by the frozen moisture. This accident was believed to be caused as the upriver valve was non opened amply and the nip at the outlet of the first valve was near the atmospheric pressure, the pressure difference cooled. It is re eachy wrong to operate the valve strategy kindred that. Therefore, the cause of the explosion is either the operators human shift or a mistake on the management not to inform the seemly execution of the operation.Cause of the ignitionThe leaked LPG is presumed to be tr avelled for a standoffishness and disperse on the ground. A car driving down a local alley might have sparked the ignition which is maybe cod to the drivers cigarette or the car engines hot temperature. Note that the layout of the plant was inhibited to the landscape a street was constructed just 50m away from the large LPG tanks which exploded during the incident. Moreover in that location was no decametre around the tanks which exploded, when large amount of LPG leaked, the vapour flew along the ground to the highway. The main cause of the ignition is that there was no dike around the LPG tanks and the outperform regulation insufficient.Secondly, the legs of the spherical tank were made of fight which werent get up proof. Thirdly, is that the distance surrounded by the near tanks was really close, The actual distance between the centre of the tanks was just 27m according to the facility information provided. This proves that the adjacent tanks were change so easily from the explosion of the first tank. howevertA BLEVE ( boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) was the disaster that occurred at Feyzin. It is an explosion phenomenon caused by the fast phase change (vaporization) of a liquid.At 630am three operators started the pee draining operation of a tank. Two valves were opened in series on the bottom of the sphere. When the operation was nearly complete, the upper valve was closed(a) and thus cracked open again. No flow came out of the cracked valve, so it was opened further. The blockage, scoop outd to be scratch or hydrate, acquited and propane gushed out. The operator was unable to close the upper valve and by the beat he attempt to close the lower valve this was also frozen open. The LPG leak started here because that valve was not closed completely. After a few minutes the operators were covered in propane vapour. The leaking LPG spread in the direction of the highway, with partially vaporizing. The alarm rang in the later ality room at this snip.At around 705am the alarm rang and it is not clear if it rang throughout the Feyzin districts or just the Feyzin refinery. The first fire hand truck of the factory turned out readyly. After this the traffic on the highway close to the refinery was stopped. The fire brigade of Lyon arrived at 720.Just aft(prenominal) 730am, a car came and stopped on the local lane where the traffic had not been stopped. The explosion apparently occurred later the car had stopped. The fire attachd in power, spread along the leaking LPG, and the tank was overcome with flames immediately.By 840am the first tank at the refinery exploded by the BLEVE. The uphold and third gear spherical tanks exploded five minutes later. Two much spherical tanks and many oil tanks burned continuously. The next day in the morning the fire was extinguished.As a result of this it was reported that 18-81 persons died and slightly 80-130 persons got injured include members of the fire fightin g team. The physical damage included five LPG tanks, many atmospheric tanks containing crude oil and jet fuel, and so on. The Feyzin Refinery suffered extensive damage.The LPG tank farm where the sphere was located consisted of iv 1200 m3 propane and four 2000 m3 butane spheres. The fire brigade arrived on site, but were not experienced in dealing in refinery fires, and it appears they did not attempt to cool the burning sphere. They severe their hoses on cooling the remaining spheres. About 90 minutes after the initial leakage, the sphere ruptured, killing the men nearby. A wave of liquid propane flowed over the compound contend and fragments of the ruptured sphere cut through the legs of the next sphere which toppled over. The relief valve on this tank began to emit liquid.What is believed to have happened on the day of the accident is the upriver valve was not opened in full and the pressure at the outlet of the first valve was near atmospheric pressure, hence the upstream v alve was cooled by the pressure difference.It is absolutely prohibited to operate valves in such manner. Therefore, the cause of the accident is either the operators human error or a mistake on management side in not explaining the ripe operation protocols.Another contributing factor to the accident is that the operator did not close the downstream valve. There is insufficient information available to wherefore this valve was not closed. It is assumed that either ice is generated in the downstream valve like in the upstream valve or a rapid large LPG leak occurred, the operator may have panicked when they could not close the upstream valve and therefore may have not remembered to close the downstream valve. essentially they had to decr ministration the downstream valve opening when the LPG began to appear in the drain water. whence the valve had to be closed at the end of the drain engagement. Either they forgot to play out this procedure or they could not close the second val ve because it had also become stuck by freezing.1) Valve A is closed2) Valve A cracks open3) Valve A becomes blocked due to freezing4) No flow through valve A5) Valve A is opened6) Ice block in valve A becomes dislodged7) Valve A freezes in open position8) Unable to close valve A9) Valve B freezes in open position10) Unable to close valve B11) Pressure sphere fluid leaks through open valves12) Fluid level in pressure watercraft drops decreasing internal pressure13) Liquid propane begins to boil due to pressure drop14) Pressure in vessel increases due to liberated gaseous propane15) Fluid flow through valves A and B increases due to increase in pressure16) Vessel pressure continues to increase17) Pressure vessel ruptures18) Gaseous propane escapes vesselRecommendations and summary* Geographical fix and details* History of Feyzin, including cascade events* Incident timeline and assertable description of why it happened* Geographical effects of the incident* Results of the inquiry a nd official recommendations* Personal recommendations not covered by the interrogative sentenceGeographical localization and detailsIn order to get a get out imageing of the scale of the Feyzin incident, it is important to note the location of the site in regards to the local area in which the site was and still is positioned. This will give an indication to sense the galoshty procedures that were in place at the time of the incident and how sine qua non procedures were carried out at the time.It has proven very difficult to obtain a clear picture of the geographical location either prior to or pursuance the incident of the site and so it will be assumed that the current location of the site, circa 2009, is the same location at the time of the incident. Close query of this map may also indicate the most likely spot of the epicentre of the primary detonation.Fig 1. Map of Feyzin Birds eye view 2009Sandwiched between the A7 Expressway to the east of the site and the Le gran d large river to the west, on close examination, it appears that some form of storage containers are located just west of the top E15 label in the image. This may lead us to assume that the storage containers were in the same location prior to the 1966 incident.On a broader scale it may also be seen that this location is almost 10 km south of the major city of Lyon. Research suggests that at the time of the incident, the site lacked any serious on site systems in case of a major crisis, relying more on the local public function to resolve anything arising such as the incident in question.Again on close inspection of the map, it trick be seen that the site is placed indoors a fairly urbanised area. Again we essential assume a similar layout at the time of the incident though populations will be quite different from the 1966 incident and the 2009 map. This will assist in understanding the cause of the incident overall and the scale of the overall effect in this area.Apart from j ust repeating the timeline for the actual incident, it is important to try and understand why the incident took place, outside of the events leading up to and after what happened.The epoch of events surrounding the cracking and freezing of the upper valve, and the subsequent rupture of the pressure vessel need to be understood, in order to get a better understanding of how such a crises may be avoided in the afterlife. These events may only have taken place over a very short time frame but they are essential to understanding the crises.One of the critical questions that should be asked is why following the closure of valve A and the subsequent cracking and freezing up of the valve, was the valve wherefore opened. Thus allowing the ice block to become dislodged and the rest of the above sequence to take place.The reasons for this particular action, in opening valve A may be exposit in four ways. The first surmisal may be a straightforward case of curiosity. The valve was closed and froze, and so to check that the valve was still powerful running(a) was then opened.The second possibility is that the correct procedure for such an event was not mightily followed. That the correct procedure would have stated that in such an event, the valve should have been kept closed and the problem be properly reported to maintenance. Therefore the valve operator was responsible for the incident that took place.The third possibility is that no official procedure or dressing had been formulated for such an event. Therefore panic may have ensued resulting in the opening of the valve as a panic decision which female genitalia therefore be described as human error.The fourth possibility is that the official procedure was followed properly and that the procedure was critically floored. So the issue of a misunderstanding of such an event or even ignorance of such was present at the time of this crisis.The third possibility seems likely case based on the immediate actions of the individual as he made the decision not to use a phone close to the pressure tank and instead ran just about 800 meters to the next nearest phone in the fear of causing a detonation of the released vapour cloud. The fourth possibility may also have some bearing in the crisis as prior to this event, the term BLEVE had still not been discovered or at least recorded prior to this.The rest of the sequence should be covered in the full crack-up of the crisis.An important issue to be considered is the overall aver displayed by both the urgency and municipal authorities during the crisis. Even though the A7 expressway was closed following the leak, the authorities failed to close the local roads to all traffic, which resulted in a car being within 160 meters of the leaking pressure tank and causing the point of ignition.The failings in the emergency service appear to be more in association with a lack of sufficient training in the order of dealing with industrial crises as it was p rimarily there to deal with public situations. This resulted in a fatal misunderstanding of how to control such a situation as a leaking pressure tank and resulting fire, due to a lack of prior knowledge which is strengthened in the term BLEVE only being created some 4 to 5 eld laterResults of the interrogationfulness and official recommendationsThe official investigation was not fully resolved until 1971 by the Grenoble court case. This may have been due to governmental reasons or due to the enquiry investigating why the crisis had occurred in the first place. On the principal that such events have happened since the Feyzin disaster, it cannot be assumed that the enquiry was successful in bringing about sufficient change in the safety of pressurised fluid containment.Personal recommendations not covered by the enquiryThe first recommendations are for the design and construction of all current and future proposed plants dealing with pressurised fluid containment. The second reco mmendations are in association with work practices involved on chemical plants in general.Third valve (reserve)A third valve should be installed for the purpose of maintenance and crisis control. To be kept open at all times so as not to induce superfluous wear and tear on the valve. When maintenance is required to be carried out on the two principal valves, the reserve can be unopen to allow for maintenance to be carried out safely. In the event of a crisis similar to that of Feyzin, this valve can be shut as an emergency prat up system in minimising fluid leakage from the pressure vessel.Cold pipe up up laggingIn order to prevent freezing of any pipes or valves dealing with potentially cold fluids, lagging should be fitted to all appropriate pipe work and fittings in order to minimise any potential freezing of these systems. Systems not dealing with cold fluids essential be scrutinised independent of this point.Rubber cockeyed pressure boxHigh pressure boxes should be insta lled around all vital valves dealing with pressurised fluids. They should be big enough to allow for ease of working but not to big as to incur any additional hazard to plant running. They should be designed with an environmental rubberised blockade so that if a valve begins to leak, the box can but locked shut with an emergency key. Thus minimising any excessive leakage until the situation can be bought under control. See A third valve (reserve)Deluge system maintain box and master switchIf geographically located near to a natural water source as in the case of the Feyzin site, a deluge system should be installed. It must have pipe work leading to all critical locations around the entirety of the plant. This system must be regularly checked so as to remain in good working order. Each piece of equipment covered by this system must be fitted with a local switch, so in the event of either a leak or a fire, the operator can activate the system in order to prevent escalation of the s ituation.A telephone exchange control post should be equipped with a control dialog box covering all local deluge systems via an override system and also be installed with a master switch that can activate all systems at once. This will allow for the main operator to activate systems in a sequence or all at once should a major sit6uation occur. Communication is vital for this system to work properly, so an emergency phone network should be installed in order to insure proper working of the system. This will only be part of the solution and fire brigades properly trained with dealing with such an event will plug that the crisis is resolved potently.Completion of site before going onlineIt is important that a site should be safe to operate before going online. In the case of Feyzin, the site was still under construction when the accident occurred. Even though construction work may not have been the cause of the incident, neither can the incompletion of the site be assumed to have h elped in the scale of the incident itself. So before a plant can go online, all safety systems must be installed.This is not to be confused with site maintenance which is an ongoing process throughout the plants lifetime. inclusion of full earthworks around siteOnly effective if any vapour or fluid is heavier than atmospheric air. May also be affected by environmental conditions, however if all other systems are overwhelmed, then this system is designed to delay the spread of any possible leak. worldly concern works should be built around all containment vessels and if possible the entire site. So in case of an emergency, any leaking vapour may be contained within the confines of either the leaking vessel or the plant.Fig. 2 illustration of valves which were major cause of accidentPreventionsTo prevent valves from freezing redundant sampling valves and drain valves are installed in series. In the tank involved in this accident, the double valve was already installed. In the LPG t ank, the doubling of the valve is a minimum necessity as in the case of a single valve, there is a strong possibility that the valves main body will be cooled, prejudicial the closing function of the valve by freezing of the moisture in the air. The distance between the two valves must be sufficient to prevent the low temperature of the second valve affecting it. The size of the second valve must be approximately 10mm or less. It is recommended that a distance of 1m or more to be allowed between valve 1 and 2.Counter measures in other facilities around the world* dkm installation LPG spreads along the ground as it is heavier than the air. A dike is effective for prevention the spread of LPG.* As a precaution against the BLEVE phenomenon, the tank wall must be cooled by placing water showering facilities above the tank.* The Tank legs must be fire proofed. If the legs are made from iron they can be damaged by fire.* The distance between tanks is kept to prevent the spread of fire s. The minimum distance is generally the diameter of the larger tank, however if possible greater distance between tanks is recommended.* Gas detectors are installed within the facility.ConclusionsThe Feyzin accident was a cause by human error and unsafe conditions. The accident could have been prevented if correct procedures were followed and if the plant was designed with appropriate fail safe systems such as a dike and LPG detectors.This accident lead to a greater understanding of the BLEVE phenomenon and has given future LPG companies the knowledge of its existence which has led to further research into this occurrence.Explosion of LPG tanks cause devastating damage. The companies that store and handle large volumes of LPG must consult with the local government to ensure they can communicate with the local government, inform local inhabitants and relay instructions for how to restrict traffic in case of an LPG leak.It has now become clear that the location for which the plant is located must be thoroughly studied, to ensure there is enough distance between the plant and built up areas. Without doubt future companies designing LPG refinery plants can benefit from the findings of this accident report.GlossaryBLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour ExplosionLPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas